| Since the release of IEEE-1584 in September | | | | sources, energized capacitors, undocumented |
| 2002 and NFPA-70E, 2004 Edition, I have talked | | | | switching conditions, and unknown voltages, in |
| with hundreds of facility engineers concerned | | | | addition to the problem of not being able to |
| about NFPA-70E arc flash hazard compliance. | | | | accurately perform lock-out-tag-out procedures. |
| NFPA, the IEEE Safety Committee, and other | | | | This is one of the most neglected aspects of |
| groups have done a great job of spreading the | | | | electrical safety in our industry. Very few of the |
| word regarding arc-flash hazards and the need to | | | | facilities I have reviewed in the past 20 years |
| address this specific safety issue. | | | | maintain accurate electrical one-line diagrams. |
| Unfortunately, most engineers I have spoken with | | | | Accurate one-lines make good business sense |
| are under the misconception that if they label | | | | because work will get done more quickly, |
| equipment for arc-flash hazards, and enforce the | | | | efficiently, and safely. |
| use of personal protective equipment (PPE) per | | | | Article 400.5, 400.6 Equipment duty verification -- |
| the label, they are in compliance with 70E and | | | | Another important aspect is proper application and |
| OSHA requirements. Nothing could be further | | | | rating of equipment for the available short circuit |
| from the truth. Arc-flash hazard labeling and PPE | | | | duty. One facility I reviewed recently had |
| compliance are only a small part of 70E | | | | underrated 13.8 kV breakers in an open |
| compliance and even a smaller part of a properly | | | | switchyard. We informed them of the problem, |
| defined safety program. | | | | but management did not take the warning |
| Very few facility engineers appear to understand | | | | seriously, since it had operated for twenty years |
| the thought process behind 70E or the basis for | | | | without a problem. We were called in |
| the standard. If maintenance people are not | | | | approximately a year later to inspect one unit |
| informed why they must work within certain | | | | that had exploded into hundreds of pieces of |
| safety constraints, then the arc-flash label and | | | | shrapnel-like metal! |
| PPE requirements become merely another task | | | | Almost every facility has improperly applied |
| that can be sidestepped. | | | | equipment that will not withstand the available |
| Safety as a principle | | | | fault current and potentially will not clear an |
| Gary McGuire, a safety manager for a large pulp | | | | arc-hazard. These types of accidents, while not |
| and paper mill in the Northwest says, "Safety | | | | common, are very dangerous. Properly rated and |
| must be operated by principal, not practice." He | | | | verified equipment makes good business sense. |
| stresses the "why" of safety, not just the dos | | | | Unplanned outages and disaster recovery costs |
| and don'ts of a task. This knowledge gives people | | | | are expensive, and improperly rated and applied |
| confronted with something out of the ordinary, | | | | equipment can be considered negligence. |
| the background to understand the potential | | | | Article 110.7, and 130.1-3 Electrical Safety |
| dangers, enabling them to make safe choices. | | | | Program, Work Permits -- In my opinion, this is |
| Safety is a culture that must be ingrained with | | | | the heart of 70E and worker safety. Without |
| principal. This culture starts from management and | | | | safety program principals, procedures, hazard/risk |
| filters down to the worker where ultimate | | | | evaluation, work permits, and job briefing and |
| responsibility rests. | | | | planning, safety is relegated to a mere label with a |
| The current arc-flash phenomenon appears to be | | | | PPE number. Workers are then left to fend for |
| operating on fear rather than principal. The fear is | | | | themselves "to get the job done" as many have |
| massive lawsuits and OSHA fines if an accident | | | | done for years. When workers do not receive |
| does occur rather than a sound reasoning as to | | | | managerial support and are tasked with dangerous |
| why a safety culture makes good business sense | | | | job functions, their morale deteriorates and |
| in daily operations. While it may have taken some | | | | incidents increase. This seems to be an |
| fear in the initial movement to motivate | | | | unrecognized cost in today's business culture. |
| companies toward implementing safety standards, | | | | NFPA-70E is a comprehensive document that |
| if the safety aspect of arcflash is limited to | | | | approaches safety from a system viewpoint, just |
| labeling and PPE requirements, the inclination will | | | | as system engineers do when analyzing an |
| soon wear off. | | | | electrical system. While I do not agree with |
| Labeling or stating PPE requirements will not | | | | everything in 70E, I do believe the standard is well |
| prevent accidents. Accidents are prevented and | | | | laid out and provides sufficient flexibility to allow |
| lives are saved through a foundation of safety. | | | | tailoring a safety program to the individual facility. |
| NFPA-70E and the safety culture | | | | This is an important step in developing a "safety |
| Several aspects of 70E in particular make good | | | | culture" for your facility. |
| business sense and help promote a safety culture | | | | As the word continues to spread regarding 70E, |
| in your facility: | | | | we hope more companies will begin to understand |
| Article 205.2, 120.2(F)(1)(a) Updated and verified | | | | that labels and PPE do not fulfill the requirements |
| one-line diagram -- An updated and accurate | | | | for 70E compliance. Worker safety can only be |
| electrical one-line diagram is an essential ingredient | | | | implemented through principals and culture, which |
| for electrical safety. If workers do not have an | | | | will in the long term pay benefits to the bottom |
| accurate map of the system, they can be | | | | line. |
| exposed to potential back feeds from alternate | | | | |