| No single theory has been developed which can | | | | happening. |
| be applied to determine what decision a safety | | | | Another view that is just as critical in preventing |
| manager must take under all specific risk profiles | | | | accidents is that the design, configuration and |
| and all variable circumstance. What is required, | | | | layout of structures and assemblies be maintained |
| being the closest to a theory that tells one which | | | | to prevent such deviation to contribute to |
| decision to make, are the criteria to be used for | | | | accidents happening. In practice a number of |
| decision making. In order to develop appropriate | | | | cases have been recorded where the design or |
| decision making criteria one needs to understand | | | | layout are not maintained, it contributed to serious |
| the specific risk profiles, the variable | | | | accidents occurring. |
| circumstances and the alignment of the maturity | | | | Imperfect Procedures |
| levels of the management style with that of the | | | | The developing and implementing of appropriate |
| organisation and the skill levels of the work force. | | | | procedures will not in itself result in an accident |
| One must establish what the appropriate criteria | | | | free work environment, however it is a known |
| are for various risk profiles are and then utilize the | | | | fact that where appropriate procedures have |
| criteria intelligently. Despite this there can be no | | | | been implemented the number of accidents are |
| guarantee that utilising a set of criteria will result in | | | | significantly less than workplaces where this is not |
| the correct decision, however it will provide the | | | | the case. |
| confidence that the decision maker have the best | | | | According to Vincoli (1993) procedures should be |
| probability of making the most appropriate | | | | developed to assist personnel to safely operate |
| decision. One way in which the probability of | | | | hazardous systems. He continues that procedures |
| success can be improved, can be to utilise a | | | | may include the use of personal protective |
| scientific model as a basis to formulate decision | | | | equipment in hazardous conditions. There are a |
| making criteria. | | | | number of regulatory requirements and Act of |
| Most safety decisions are made to prevent | | | | parliament that also identifies the use of personal |
| accidents or reduce their impact. In order to | | | | protective equipment as a means of minimising |
| improve accident prevention decision making | | | | the risk to workers under certain circumstances. |
| criteria it may be beneficial to base these types | | | | In most instances where the implementation of |
| of decisions on a scientific accident model. It is for | | | | procedures fails to prevent accidents it has been |
| this reason that fundamental contributing factor | | | | identified than that the procedure did not take |
| theory accident model is described in this article. | | | | cognisance of variable conditions. In addition to this |
| In order to clarify the interaction of the various | | | | the buy-in from the workforce to follow a specific |
| failure modes present in the model, a graphic | | | | procedure is reduced where consultation have not |
| representation is represented in a figure that can | | | | taken place during the development process. |
| be accessed by following a link at the end of this | | | | Unsuitable Task Directives |
| article. | | | | A task directive is a detailed explanation of the |
| In the graphic representation the fundamental | | | | steps to be followed to enable a worker to safely |
| contributing factors are represented as individual | | | | conduct the tasks making up a job. In the |
| solid plates rotating at individual, varying speeds on | | | | absence of a task directive the complexities of a |
| a common axis. Each plate in the model | | | | task is left to the discretion of the worker. This |
| represents a fundamental contributing factor | | | | often, results in tasks being conducted without |
| associated with a potential accident. The solid | | | | the impact of the specific order being considered. |
| parts of the plates represent a perfect condition | | | | For this reason all high-risk tasks should be |
| in each of the elements. The randomly positioned | | | | supported with a suitable task directive. |
| holes in the plates represent failure modes of the | | | | In order to explain the lack of suitable task |
| fundamental contributing factors. The fundamental | | | | directives one should consider that the supervisor |
| contributing factors identified to be present in | | | | issuing the task directive normally has a totally |
| most accidents are:o Energy sources out of | | | | different frame of reference than the worker |
| control,o Management system failure,o Training | | | | receiving the directive. |
| deficiency,o Latent design defects,o Inappropriate | | | | The correct way to establish a proper task |
| maintenance,o Imperfect procedures,o Unsuitable | | | | directive is as follows:o Put the worker at ease.o |
| task directives,o Substandard physical conditions,o | | | | Tell the worker about the task to be performed.o |
| Unsafe acts,o Barrier failures. | | | | Explain the context of the task, including the |
| If at any time all the theoretical holes are aligned, | | | | impact it may have on other workers busy on |
| or arranged so that a line of sight passes through | | | | the same job.o Explain the task detail steps to |
| all the plates, an accident will result. In practice this | | | | the worker, emphasising the high risk activities |
| means that an unsafe act or any of the other | | | | and the standard control measures to reduce the |
| factors alone cannot cause an accident. The | | | | risks of the task.o Request the worker to repeat |
| unsafe act forms part of a system of interactive | | | | the steps of the task, including the safety |
| failures where all the fundamental contributing | | | | precautions to be followed.o Correct any |
| factors have a defect lined up in the | | | | deviations and again confirm understanding.o |
| four-dimensional space-time continuum. This may | | | | Instruct worker when and where to start the |
| explain why defects in any of the fundamental | | | | task. |
| contributing factor areas may exist for a long | | | | The above steps in issuing a task directive is not |
| time without an accident resulting. | | | | exhaustive, but is deemed to be the minimum |
| The following section gives a more in depth | | | | requirement for issuing s task directive. |
| description of each of the fundamental | | | | Substandard Physical Conditions |
| contributing factors contained in the model. | | | | The physical environment, and especially sudden |
| Energy Source / Hazardous Materials | | | | changes to that environment, should be identified |
| According to Haddon (1967) damage is caused to | | | | by the worker on the workplace. Changes in the |
| the body of a living being when the amount of | | | | conditions should be dealt with by the workers on |
| energy applied to the body is in excess of the | | | | discovery. The actual situation at the time of |
| corresponding injury threshold of the body. This | | | | conducting at risk activities is important, not the |
| implies that when the energy of the impact is | | | | usual conditions, according to A Guide to Accident |
| greater than the capacity of the body to absorb | | | | Investigation by the Canadian Centre for |
| it, injuries will result. The more the threshold is | | | | Occupational Health & Safety to prevent |
| exceeded the more serious the injury will be. | | | | accidents. |
| Over the years a significant number of studies | | | | Once an accident happened, investigators may |
| have been launched to establish the links between | | | | want to establish, for example, how the conditions |
| the energy of the impact and the subsequent | | | | at the time of the accident differed from the |
| injuries on the person. Most of these studies have | | | | so-called normal conditions at the scene in order |
| been conducted for and on behalf of the motor | | | | to establish contributing factors with the aim of |
| industry worldwide. The results of these studies | | | | preventing future accidents. |
| have already significantly influenced design of | | | | It is important that investigators understand that |
| motor vehicles in the interest of safety. | | | | task directives, procedures and maintenance |
| A number of commonly occurring energy sources | | | | programmes are normally based on so called |
| have been identified in the literature. For the | | | | standard conditions. Should the physical conditions |
| purposes of the industrial environment the | | | | vary from the expected, the task directives, |
| following can be utilized as a guideline:o Mechanical | | | | procedures and maintenance programmes may |
| energyo Electrical energyo Thermal energyo | | | | become inappropriate to prevent accidents. |
| Chemical and Bio-chemical energyo | | | | Unsafe Acts |
| Electromagnetic energyo Potential (gravitational) | | | | Research about accidents indicates that upwards |
| energyo Kinetic energyo Acoustic energy | | | | of 85% of all accidents can be attributed to the |
| Various elements present prior to an accident | | | | so called human factor. The safety manager |
| may trigger the release of large amounts of | | | | should not confuse the human factor with unsafe |
| energy or hazardous materials. During | | | | acts. Human factors include behaviours as well as |
| investigations or preventative design it is | | | | unsafe acts. A full discussion on behaviour is dealt |
| important to establish the energy source or | | | | with else ware in this chapter. The unsafe act is |
| hazardous materials that may be causing the | | | | the one contributing factor that most authors use |
| injury as a result of the actual or potential | | | | to try and explain the reason for accidents, but it |
| exceeding of the threshold limit of the exposed | | | | is also the most controversial and misunderstood |
| person's body. | | | | factor. Acts or omissions are often utilised to |
| Safety Management System Failure | | | | apportion blame and prosecute individuals under |
| A safety management system is an integral part | | | | some law. It is normally focused on the acts of |
| of the overall management system that | | | | the injured or persons in the immediate vicinity of |
| specifically facilitates the management of the | | | | the accident, and in so doing moves the focus |
| occupational health and safety risks associated | | | | away from more remote but equally important |
| with the business of the organization. This includes | | | | unsafe acts. |
| the organizational structure, planning activities, | | | | It is important to try to establish all the so called |
| responsibilities, practices, procedures, processes | | | | unsafe acts and or omissions in all the aspects of |
| and resources for developing, implementing, | | | | the at risk activity. Should an unsafe act or |
| achieving, reviewing and maintaining the | | | | mission be identified it must be the aim to |
| organization's occupational health and safety policy. | | | | prevent such act or omission in the future by |
| The role of safety management system failure | | | | understanding the reason for it rather than utilising |
| should be critically reviewed during the accident | | | | it to apportion blame for the accident. |
| investigation. The main objective of safety | | | | Barrier Failure |
| management systems is to effectively manage | | | | Barriers consist basically of two types namely |
| the identified significant risks by ensuring that | | | | physical and time barriers. The purpose of physical |
| control measures for these risks are constantly in | | | | barriers is to physically prevent the energy source |
| place. This implies that an appropriate risk | | | | to come into contact with persons in the event |
| assessment was conducted and that the resulting | | | | of other failures. When assessing the |
| risk profiles are utilised to direct prevention | | | | effectiveness of physical barriers it is important to |
| activities. As the Safety Management system | | | | establish the capability of the barrier to arrest the |
| forms the foundation of the safety management | | | | energy source in such a way that the energy will |
| activities it will have to be designed to an | | | | be dissipated so that the threshold limit of the |
| appropriate level of complexity to cater for the | | | | person potentially in contact with the energy |
| risk profile of the organization to ensure that it | | | | would not be exceeded. Physical barriers include |
| does not contribute to the failure mode and | | | | barriers that would absorb the energy of an |
| accidents occur as a result. | | | | impact that exceeds the threshold limit of the |
| Training Deficiency | | | | body. Often such barriers are destroyed during |
| Organizations should have effective procedures to | | | | the impact. It is this destruction of the barrier that |
| ensure the competence of employees in order to | | | | absorbs the energy and prevents injuries. Such a |
| allow the employees to safety carry out their | | | | destruction of a barrier does not means that the |
| allocated duties. Personnel should be trained to be | | | | barrier failed, as long as the energy level has been |
| competent to perform all jobs. The accident | | | | reduced to tolerable levels the barrier did the |
| prevention training should focus on high risk tasks | | | | work it was designed to do. |
| that could impact on occupational safety in the | | | | Often it is not possible to install a physical barrier |
| workplace. To assess the level of competence | | | | and in these cases a time barrier may be just the |
| the employees should be evaluated in terms of | | | | answer. A time barrier aims to ensure the |
| their appropriate education, training and/or | | | | absence of persons during a final event. A time |
| experience to conduct the high risk tasks. | | | | barrier is typically the removal of the workforce |
| A lack of appropriate training has been identified | | | | from the affected area. In a mining environment |
| by most safety professionals as a major | | | | the workers are normally removed from the |
| contributor to the unacceptably high accident rate | | | | mine before the blast is initiated. The workers are |
| in the industrial environment. To address this | | | | then only allowed back once the dangerous |
| problem the industry agreed to the inclusion of | | | | gasses have dissipated. A time barrier can only be |
| various sections in different act that governs | | | | successfully implemented where appropriate levels |
| industrial safety. A factor that one should be | | | | of discipline are normal practise in the workforce. |
| careful about when prescribing training to prevent | | | | Behaviour |
| accidents are that training programmes are | | | | The unpredictability of the fundamental |
| normally developed for standard condition and | | | | contributing factors aligning in a four dimensional |
| very seldom take cognisance of the varying | | | | space time continuum can be ascribed to the |
| sub-normal conditions usually present at the time | | | | unpredictability of the behaviour of the various |
| of accidents. | | | | role-players. The fact that very little, if any, |
| Latent Design Defects | | | | attention is paid to the alignment of individual |
| The design of equipment or factory layout and | | | | values, with that of corporate safety values, |
| design is recognised as an important factor to | | | | could be the most significant reason for this |
| ensure that the work environment is inherently | | | | unpredictability. There are a number of |
| safe. | | | | commercially available behaviour intervention |
| Most existing accident investigation models imply | | | | techniques that could be utilised to alleviate this |
| that, in any given situation, latent design defects | | | | problem. |
| will affect the likelihood that an accident will occur. | | | | A full description of the concepts and particulars |
| Some models call it ergonomics and others | | | | necessary to implement an appropriate behaviour |
| construction failure, structural defects or assembly | | | | based programme are outside the scope of this |
| faults. Irrespective of what it is called, most | | | | article. |
| authors agree that latent design defects play an | | | | Conclusion |
| important part in any accident. | | | | Despite the fact that theories and concepts are a |
| Often latent design defects could have been | | | | very valuable basis in safety management, the |
| identified prior to purchasing of the parts or | | | | practical success lies in the effective translation of |
| equipment but missed as the safety professional | | | | these theories and concepts into actions related |
| does not form part of the approval process for | | | | to the goals and objectives and aligning of the |
| the acquisition of new parts or equipment. | | | | actions with the risk profile. |
| Inappropriate Maintenance | | | | Theories could be utilised to evaluate past |
| Most modern accident investigation models have | | | | experience and adapt future implementation |
| underplayed the contribution of inappropriate | | | | practises taking these experiences into account. |
| maintenance to accidents. Vincoli (1993) identifies | | | | As long as the evaluation takes the variability of |
| maintenance as a factor in accidents but focuses | | | | the conditions in account a solid analysis is possible. |
| on the contribution that maintenance personnel | | | | Irrespective of what accident model is used to |
| can make in identifying potential hazards and risk. | | | | investigate accidents it is important to adjust the |
| One (correct) interpretation of maintenance are | | | | model dimensions to the site specific risk profile |
| the replacement of worn components on | | | | where the accident occurred to gain the |
| equipment with suitable components prior to such | | | | maximum benefit from using the model. |
| worn components contribute to an accident | | | | |