Explaining the Fundamental Contributing Factor Theory Accident Model

No single theory has been developed which canhappening.
be applied to determine what decision a safetyAnother view that is just as critical in preventing
manager must take under all specific risk profilesaccidents is that the design, configuration and
and all variable circumstance. What is required,layout of structures and assemblies be maintained
being the closest to a theory that tells one whichto prevent such deviation to contribute to
decision to make, are the criteria to be used foraccidents happening. In practice a number of
decision making. In order to develop appropriatecases have been recorded where the design or
decision making criteria one needs to understandlayout are not maintained, it contributed to serious
the specific risk profiles, the variableaccidents occurring.
circumstances and the alignment of the maturityImperfect Procedures
levels of the management style with that of theThe developing and implementing of appropriate
organisation and the skill levels of the work force.procedures will not in itself result in an accident
One must establish what the appropriate criteriafree work environment, however it is a known
are for various risk profiles are and then utilize thefact that where appropriate procedures have
criteria intelligently. Despite this there can be nobeen implemented the number of accidents are
guarantee that utilising a set of criteria will result insignificantly less than workplaces where this is not
the correct decision, however it will provide thethe case.
confidence that the decision maker have the bestAccording to Vincoli (1993) procedures should be
probability of making the most appropriatedeveloped to assist personnel to safely operate
decision. One way in which the probability ofhazardous systems. He continues that procedures
success can be improved, can be to utilise amay include the use of personal protective
scientific model as a basis to formulate decisionequipment in hazardous conditions. There are a
making criteria.number of regulatory requirements and Act of
Most safety decisions are made to preventparliament that also identifies the use of personal
accidents or reduce their impact. In order toprotective equipment as a means of minimising
improve accident prevention decision makingthe risk to workers under certain circumstances.
criteria it may be beneficial to base these typesIn most instances where the implementation of
of decisions on a scientific accident model. It is forprocedures fails to prevent accidents it has been
this reason that fundamental contributing factoridentified than that the procedure did not take
theory accident model is described in this article.cognisance of variable conditions. In addition to this
In order to clarify the interaction of the variousthe buy-in from the workforce to follow a specific
failure modes present in the model, a graphicprocedure is reduced where consultation have not
representation is represented in a figure that cantaken place during the development process.
be accessed by following a link at the end of thisUnsuitable Task Directives
article.A task directive is a detailed explanation of the
In the graphic representation the fundamentalsteps to be followed to enable a worker to safely
contributing factors are represented as individualconduct the tasks making up a job. In the
solid plates rotating at individual, varying speeds onabsence of a task directive the complexities of a
a common axis. Each plate in the modeltask is left to the discretion of the worker. This
represents a fundamental contributing factoroften, results in tasks being conducted without
associated with a potential accident. The solidthe impact of the specific order being considered.
parts of the plates represent a perfect conditionFor this reason all high-risk tasks should be
in each of the elements. The randomly positionedsupported with a suitable task directive.
holes in the plates represent failure modes of theIn order to explain the lack of suitable task
fundamental contributing factors. The fundamentaldirectives one should consider that the supervisor
contributing factors identified to be present inissuing the task directive normally has a totally
most accidents are:o Energy sources out ofdifferent frame of reference than the worker
control,o Management system failure,o Trainingreceiving the directive.
deficiency,o Latent design defects,o InappropriateThe correct way to establish a proper task
maintenance,o Imperfect procedures,o Unsuitabledirective is as follows:o Put the worker at ease.o
task directives,o Substandard physical conditions,oTell the worker about the task to be performed.o
Unsafe acts,o Barrier failures.Explain the context of the task, including the
If at any time all the theoretical holes are aligned,impact it may have on other workers busy on
or arranged so that a line of sight passes throughthe same job.o Explain the task detail steps to
all the plates, an accident will result. In practice thisthe worker, emphasising the high risk activities
means that an unsafe act or any of the otherand the standard control measures to reduce the
factors alone cannot cause an accident. Therisks of the task.o Request the worker to repeat
unsafe act forms part of a system of interactivethe steps of the task, including the safety
failures where all the fundamental contributingprecautions to be followed.o Correct any
factors have a defect lined up in thedeviations and again confirm understanding.o
four-dimensional space-time continuum. This mayInstruct worker when and where to start the
explain why defects in any of the fundamentaltask.
contributing factor areas may exist for a longThe above steps in issuing a task directive is not
time without an accident resulting.exhaustive, but is deemed to be the minimum
The following section gives a more in depthrequirement for issuing s task directive.
description of each of the fundamentalSubstandard Physical Conditions
contributing factors contained in the model.The physical environment, and especially sudden
Energy Source / Hazardous Materialschanges to that environment, should be identified
According to Haddon (1967) damage is caused toby the worker on the workplace. Changes in the
the body of a living being when the amount ofconditions should be dealt with by the workers on
energy applied to the body is in excess of thediscovery. The actual situation at the time of
corresponding injury threshold of the body. Thisconducting at risk activities is important, not the
implies that when the energy of the impact isusual conditions, according to A Guide to Accident
greater than the capacity of the body to absorbInvestigation by the Canadian Centre for
it, injuries will result. The more the threshold isOccupational Health & Safety to prevent
exceeded the more serious the injury will be.accidents.
Over the years a significant number of studiesOnce an accident happened, investigators may
have been launched to establish the links betweenwant to establish, for example, how the conditions
the energy of the impact and the subsequentat the time of the accident differed from the
injuries on the person. Most of these studies haveso-called normal conditions at the scene in order
been conducted for and on behalf of the motorto establish contributing factors with the aim of
industry worldwide. The results of these studiespreventing future accidents.
have already significantly influenced design ofIt is important that investigators understand that
motor vehicles in the interest of safety.task directives, procedures and maintenance
A number of commonly occurring energy sourcesprogrammes are normally based on so called
have been identified in the literature. For thestandard conditions. Should the physical conditions
purposes of the industrial environment thevary from the expected, the task directives,
following can be utilized as a guideline:o Mechanicalprocedures and maintenance programmes may
energyo Electrical energyo Thermal energyobecome inappropriate to prevent accidents.
Chemical and Bio-chemical energyoUnsafe Acts
Electromagnetic energyo Potential (gravitational)Research about accidents indicates that upwards
energyo Kinetic energyo Acoustic energyof 85% of all accidents can be attributed to the
Various elements present prior to an accidentso called human factor. The safety manager
may trigger the release of large amounts ofshould not confuse the human factor with unsafe
energy or hazardous materials. Duringacts. Human factors include behaviours as well as
investigations or preventative design it isunsafe acts. A full discussion on behaviour is dealt
important to establish the energy source orwith else ware in this chapter. The unsafe act is
hazardous materials that may be causing thethe one contributing factor that most authors use
injury as a result of the actual or potentialto try and explain the reason for accidents, but it
exceeding of the threshold limit of the exposedis also the most controversial and misunderstood
person's body.factor. Acts or omissions are often utilised to
Safety Management System Failureapportion blame and prosecute individuals under
A safety management system is an integral partsome law. It is normally focused on the acts of
of the overall management system thatthe injured or persons in the immediate vicinity of
specifically facilitates the management of thethe accident, and in so doing moves the focus
occupational health and safety risks associatedaway from more remote but equally important
with the business of the organization. This includesunsafe acts.
the organizational structure, planning activities,It is important to try to establish all the so called
responsibilities, practices, procedures, processesunsafe acts and or omissions in all the aspects of
and resources for developing, implementing,the at risk activity. Should an unsafe act or
achieving, reviewing and maintaining themission be identified it must be the aim to
organization's occupational health and safety policy.prevent such act or omission in the future by
The role of safety management system failureunderstanding the reason for it rather than utilising
should be critically reviewed during the accidentit to apportion blame for the accident.
investigation. The main objective of safetyBarrier Failure
management systems is to effectively manageBarriers consist basically of two types namely
the identified significant risks by ensuring thatphysical and time barriers. The purpose of physical
control measures for these risks are constantly inbarriers is to physically prevent the energy source
place. This implies that an appropriate riskto come into contact with persons in the event
assessment was conducted and that the resultingof other failures. When assessing the
risk profiles are utilised to direct preventioneffectiveness of physical barriers it is important to
activities. As the Safety Management systemestablish the capability of the barrier to arrest the
forms the foundation of the safety managementenergy source in such a way that the energy will
activities it will have to be designed to anbe dissipated so that the threshold limit of the
appropriate level of complexity to cater for theperson potentially in contact with the energy
risk profile of the organization to ensure that itwould not be exceeded. Physical barriers include
does not contribute to the failure mode andbarriers that would absorb the energy of an
accidents occur as a result.impact that exceeds the threshold limit of the
Training Deficiencybody. Often such barriers are destroyed during
Organizations should have effective procedures tothe impact. It is this destruction of the barrier that
ensure the competence of employees in order toabsorbs the energy and prevents injuries. Such a
allow the employees to safety carry out theirdestruction of a barrier does not means that the
allocated duties. Personnel should be trained to bebarrier failed, as long as the energy level has been
competent to perform all jobs. The accidentreduced to tolerable levels the barrier did the
prevention training should focus on high risk taskswork it was designed to do.
that could impact on occupational safety in theOften it is not possible to install a physical barrier
workplace. To assess the level of competenceand in these cases a time barrier may be just the
the employees should be evaluated in terms ofanswer. A time barrier aims to ensure the
their appropriate education, training and/orabsence of persons during a final event. A time
experience to conduct the high risk tasks.barrier is typically the removal of the workforce
A lack of appropriate training has been identifiedfrom the affected area. In a mining environment
by most safety professionals as a majorthe workers are normally removed from the
contributor to the unacceptably high accident ratemine before the blast is initiated. The workers are
in the industrial environment. To address thisthen only allowed back once the dangerous
problem the industry agreed to the inclusion ofgasses have dissipated. A time barrier can only be
various sections in different act that governssuccessfully implemented where appropriate levels
industrial safety. A factor that one should beof discipline are normal practise in the workforce.
careful about when prescribing training to preventBehaviour
accidents are that training programmes areThe unpredictability of the fundamental
normally developed for standard condition andcontributing factors aligning in a four dimensional
very seldom take cognisance of the varyingspace time continuum can be ascribed to the
sub-normal conditions usually present at the timeunpredictability of the behaviour of the various
of accidents.role-players. The fact that very little, if any,
Latent Design Defectsattention is paid to the alignment of individual
The design of equipment or factory layout andvalues, with that of corporate safety values,
design is recognised as an important factor tocould be the most significant reason for this
ensure that the work environment is inherentlyunpredictability. There are a number of
safe.commercially available behaviour intervention
Most existing accident investigation models implytechniques that could be utilised to alleviate this
that, in any given situation, latent design defectsproblem.
will affect the likelihood that an accident will occur.A full description of the concepts and particulars
Some models call it ergonomics and othersnecessary to implement an appropriate behaviour
construction failure, structural defects or assemblybased programme are outside the scope of this
faults. Irrespective of what it is called, mostarticle.
authors agree that latent design defects play anConclusion
important part in any accident.Despite the fact that theories and concepts are a
Often latent design defects could have beenvery valuable basis in safety management, the
identified prior to purchasing of the parts orpractical success lies in the effective translation of
equipment but missed as the safety professionalthese theories and concepts into actions related
does not form part of the approval process forto the goals and objectives and aligning of the
the acquisition of new parts or equipment.actions with the risk profile.
Inappropriate MaintenanceTheories could be utilised to evaluate past
Most modern accident investigation models haveexperience and adapt future implementation
underplayed the contribution of inappropriatepractises taking these experiences into account.
maintenance to accidents. Vincoli (1993) identifiesAs long as the evaluation takes the variability of
maintenance as a factor in accidents but focusesthe conditions in account a solid analysis is possible.
on the contribution that maintenance personnelIrrespective of what accident model is used to
can make in identifying potential hazards and risk.investigate accidents it is important to adjust the
One (correct) interpretation of maintenance aremodel dimensions to the site specific risk profile
the replacement of worn components onwhere the accident occurred to gain the
equipment with suitable components prior to suchmaximum benefit from using the model.
worn components contribute to an accident